IN SHORT: Turkey’s state-owned drillship Cagri Bey reached Somali waters on April 6, 2026, to begin Somalia’s first-ever offshore oil drilling campaign. The operation follows 234 days of seismic surveys by the research vessel Oruç Reis across 4,464 square kilometres of Somali offshore blocks in 2024 to 2025. Somalia’s Petroleum Minister Dahir Shire called it "a historic milestone in our offshore energy journey."
Somalia launched its first offshore oil drilling operation on April 6 as the Turkish state-owned drillship Cagri Bey arrived off the Somali coast under Turkish naval escort, beginning a campaign that Petroleum Minister Dahir Shire described as "unstoppable" and that could determine whether a country estimated to hold up to 30 billion barrels of oil reserves becomes a producer after three decades of conflict and deferred ambition. The drilling follows the completion of extensive 3D seismic surveys by the Turkish exploration vessel Oruç Reis, which operated in Somali waters from October 2024 to July 2025 across three offshore blocks totalling approximately 4,464 square kilometres.
- The drillship Cagri Bey departed Mersin Tasucu, Turkey, in February 2026 and arrived in Somali waters on April 6, protected by a Turkish naval task force given the security risks in the Indian Ocean zone.
- Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said the operation targets deep waters of approximately 3,000 metres, making this one of the most technically complex ultra-deepwater drilling campaigns on the African continent.
- Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) holds exploration and production rights across three offshore blocks of roughly 5,000 square kilometres each, and signed an additional onshore agreement in April 2025 covering three inland blocks totalling 16,000 square kilometres.
- US government assessments suggest Somalia may hold at least 30 billion barrels of oil and gas reserves. A 2012 estimate placed total reserves across 53 offshore blocks at a value of $8.5 trillion. Commercially viable results from any single well could take three to five years to bring to production.
- Turkey’s deal with Somalia has drawn criticism domestically and in the Somali parliament for bypassing a competitive bidding process, excluding regional federal states such as Puntland and Jubaland from consultations, and requiring legal disputes to be settled in Istanbul courts rather than through international arbitration.
- TPAO’s cost recovery rate is reported at up to 90%, meaning the majority of initial oil revenues would flow to Turkey until exploration costs are recouped, before Somalia’s revenue share activates.
- Turkey has invested over $1 billion in Somalia since 2011, operates its largest overseas military base (Camp TURKSOM) in Mogadishu, manages the city’s airport and port through Turkish firms, and has trained approximately one-third of Somalia’s military forces.
Somalia’s relationship with Turkey is the most comprehensive external partnership on the continent: military training, infrastructure management, humanitarian investment, and now energy extraction, all bundled into a single bilateral framework. That depth of integration is precisely what makes the deal controversial. Critics argue Somalia negotiated from a position of extreme dependency, accepting terms that a more stable government with alternative partners could have refused. Proponents counter that Somalia has no realistic alternative: Western oil majors withdrew after 1991 and have not returned, and the technical, security, and financial requirements for deepwater drilling in conflict-adjacent waters are beyond any other credible partner’s willingness to engage.
The Bigger Picture: Somalia’s offshore drilling launch is the most significant Horn of Africa energy event since South Sudan’s oil production began in 2011. If the Cagri Bey confirms commercially viable deposits, the geopolitical implications extend well beyond Somalia: it validates Turkish energy strategy in Africa, intensifies competition between Ankara and other external actors for influence in the Horn, and raises the question of whether Somalia’s revenues from oil will be captured by the state or by the patronage networks and armed groups that have historically extracted value from the country’s resources. The 90% cost-recovery clause and the Istanbul dispute resolution clause are the two terms that will matter most if oil is found. Both are designed to protect Turkey’s investment. Whether they also protect Somalia’s is the question its parliament should have been allowed to answer.
Source: The Star / OilPrice.com
